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Abstract
The Great Recession, and the fiscal response to it, has revived interest in the
size of fiscal multipliers. Standard business cycle models have difficulties generating
multipliers greater than one. And they also fail to produce any significant asymmetry
in the size of the multipliers over the business cycle. In this paper we employ a variant
of the Curdia–Woodford model of costly financial intermediation to show that fiscal
multipliers are strongly countercyclical. In particular, they can take values exceeding
two during recessions, declining to values below one during expansions.
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Introduction
Keynes advocated a fiscal stimulus during the Great Depression, and since then gov-
ernments have routinely implemented fiscal expansions during recessions as a means of
stimulating economic activity. Standard business cycle models offer scant support for this
practice. Much of the criticism levelled at the Obama administration’s stimulus plan was
based on the implication of these models that government spending is ineffective. In a
nutshell, this implication rests on the argument that an increase in government spending
raises consumers’ expected tax burden, and this negative wealth effect largely curtails the
expansion of aggregate demand. The associated multipliers are small, hovering around one.
Moreover, as we elaborate below, these models also imply that fiscal policy is ineffective
even during very severe downturns.
The objective of this paper is to propose a model that can generate large and asymmetric
multipliers, thus potentially justifying countercyclical fiscal policy. The model represents
an extension of the Curdia and Woodford [2009, 2010] model of costly financial intermedi-
ation with borrowers and lenders. Our main extension is to allow financial frictions to vary
over the business cycle, and in particular, to be countercyclical. This possibility has been
long recognized in financial economics1 and is also confirmed by our empirical analysis.
More recently, Cromb and Vayanos [2011] develop a model that has this implication. In
particular, they show that when the wealth of financial intermediaries decreases, inter-
mediation becomes less effective (more costly) because of margin constraints and spreads
increase.
We find that countercyclical financial frictions can make multipliers large during recessions
and small during expansions.2 Multipliers are large during recessions due to the presence
of a strong financial accelerator mechanism. An increase in output mitigates the financial
friction, increasing the consumption of the borrowers as well as total consumption. Higher
consumption leads to further output gains which further alleviates the financial friction
and increases consumption and so forth.
As is well known, the empirical estimation of fiscal multipliers is a hazardous affair due
to identification and data problems. No consensus view exists in the profession regarding
their size. Nonetheless our calibrated model gives rise to multipliers that, for increases
1See, for instance, the detailed discussion in Mishkin [2001], chapters 8 and 25, about how the cyclicality
of firm net worth, of household liquidity etc. induces countercyclical variation in moral hazard and adverse
selection problems.
2Collard and Dellas [2008] calculate fiscal multipliers in the model of Bernanke et al. [1999]. They
find that they are small and exhibit limited cyclical variability. They attribute this to the limited cyclical
variability in the degree of the financial friction present in this model even when one solves the non linear
model. Similarly, in a model with financial frictions, Fernández-Villaverde [2010] finds output multipliers
of about 1.
2
in government spending of the order of 1%, are very close to those recently estimated
by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2010] and Bachmann and Sims [2011]. Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko [2010] use regime switching SVAR’s to show that output multipliers are
countercyclical. They find that the point estimates of the maximum output multiplier
(over the first 20 quarters) are 0.57 during expansions and 2.48 during recessions. When
they ignore the distinction between recessions and expansions they obtain an estimate of
1.00, which is typical of estimates in the more recent empirical literature.3
Countercyclical fiscal policy is problematic for the currently popular New-Keynesian mod-
els. Cogan et al. [2010] (CCTW hereafter) used the Smets and Wouter’s [2007] model to
compute consumption and output multipliers. They consider several alternative exper-
iments (such as permanent vs temporary government spending increases, the particular
case of the Obama administration American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, different
lengths of time for the zero bound constraint, etc.). They report that the maximum
output multiplier is about unity (and typically much smaller) and consumption and in-
vestment multipliers are negative. More importantly from the point of view of this paper
and in line with the findings of Collard and Dellas [2008], CCTW do not find any signifi-
cant variation in the multiplier over the business cycle when solving the non-linear version
of the model. In particular, using an output gap of 6.5%, and letting the zero bound be-
come endogenous hardly affects the output multipliers; if anything, it made them slightly
smaller.
The existing literature is not unanimous regarding the role of the zero nominal interest
rate bound in making fiscal multipliers larger. While CCTW find no role, Eggertsson
[2001] and Christiano et al. [2009] find that it can make a big difference for the multi-
pliers.4 Erceg and Lindé [2010] fall in between CCTW and Christiano et al. [2009]. But
independently of the effects of the zero bound on the fiscal multiplier, there seems to be
a need for a supplementary or perhaps more general explanation of the large multipliers
during recessions because nominal interest rates have not been at the zero bound for most
of the recessions in the post world war II period.5
In addition to generating large and cyclically variable fiscal multipliers, our analysis has
other useful implications. For instance, it implies that the size of the fiscal intervention
matters for the magnitude of the multiplier. In particular, while a 1% increase in govern-
3It should be noted that the standard errors of the estimates are rather large
4The mechanism is as follows. Normally, nominal and real interest rates would rise following an increase
in government spending, chocking off the expansion. But if the nominal interest rate is stuck at zero, this
channel does not operate.
5Although the mechanism presented in this paper relies on the existence of financial frictions, it does
not only apply to recessions induced by financial shocks. Most business cycle shocks will give rise to
non-linear, countercyclical multipliers in our model.
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ment purchases during a recession produces a multiplier between 2 and 3, an increase of
5% or 10% gives rise to multipliers between 1.5 and 2. The reason large fiscal interventions
are less effective than smaller ones is that the –negative– marginal wealth effect due to the
higher tax liabilities is increasing in the size of the fiscal intervention while the –positive–
marginal effect on the borrower from the reduction in the finance premium is decreasing
in the size of the fiscal expansion.
Another implication is that multipliers during recessions remain greater than one even
when the government finances higher spending through taxes. But as in the IS-LM anal-
ysis, the multipliers are even bigger for debt financed spending. The reason is that while
higher government spending sets in motion the financial accelerator, higher taxes partly
counter this by reducing the quantity of funds available to financially constrained individ-
uals.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: In Section ??, we outline the model, and describe
it’s calibration; at the end of the section, we discuss a financial accelerator that is created
by our countercyclical intermediation friction. In Section ??, we present our results for
consumption and output multipliers. We show that they involve multipliers falling short of
unity during expansion and exceeding unity during recessions. In Section ??, we conclude.
1 The Model
Our model adopts the Curdia and Woodford [2009, 2010] framework of financial
intermediation. Our main point of departure from that model is that we assume credit
market frictions are countercyclical. This is the mainstream view in the profession, but
we will present empirical evidence that offers direct support to this hypothesis, as it is
crucial to our results. And we will use our empirical findings to calibrate the parameters
of the function describing the financial friction.
It is not easy to formulate a dynamic general equilibrium model with private borrowers
and lenders. Keeping track of the wealth of heterogeneous agents can be a daunting task.
So, Curdia and Woodford devise a rather ingenious insurance scheme to make the solution
tractable. In the Curdia-Woodford framework, households have access to complete finan-
cial markets, but only on a random and infrequent basis. During the intervening periods,
the household only has access to limited – and costly – financial intermediation: savers
can deposit funds at a bank (or hold government bonds) and borrowers can obtain loans
from the bank. Banks are competitive, and they maximize profits period by period. But
more importantly, banks incur a cost when making a loan. It turns out that households’
infrequent access to complete financial markets makes wealth dynamics tractable, while
4
costly financial intermediation adds the financial friction that is at the heart of our results.
1.1 Households
In each period t an individual agent, i, has a type µ(i) ∈ {b, s}. The household’s type may
vary over time in a manner that is described below. Household i’s preferences in period t
are represented by
Et
 ∞∑
j=0
βt+j
(
uµt+j(i)
(
c
µt+j(i)
t+j (i); ξt+j
)
−
∫ 1
0
vµt+j(i)
(
h
µt+j(i)
t+j (i, f); ξt+j
)
df
) (1)
where uµ(·, ·) is the utility of consumption of type µ household. The consumption good
is a CES aggregate of the outputs of a continuum of firms, indexed by f . Members of
household i work at all of these firms, and vµ(·, ·) is the type µ household’s disutility for
the hours worked at each firm. ξt is the vector of preference shocks: specific preference
shocks for borrowers and savers, and aggregate shocks to the disutility of hours worked.
The difference between type b and type s agents lies in the fact that type b agents have a
higher marginal utility of current consumption, that is,
ubc(c, ξ) > u
s
c(c, ξ) (2)
for all c and all ξ. In equilibrium, the type b agents will borrow while the type s will save.
We will also refer to type b (resp. s) agents as impatient (resp. patient).
1.1.1 Evolution of Household Types
As explained previously, the type of an agent can change from one period to the next.6
The type change is governed by a simple stochastic process. In each and every period an
agent either keeps his type with probability δ ∈ [0, 1) or redraws a type with probability
1− δ. In the latter event, the agent draws type b –becomes a borrower– with probability
πb or type s with probability πs = 1 − πb. The law of large numbers implies that πb
and πs will be the –unchanging– fractions of borrowers and savers in the economy. The
type drawing process for somebody who is at present a saver is described in Figure 1 (a
similar process applies to a current borrower). Given that agents can switch type with
probability 1−δ, the number of household histories goes to infinity, potentially generating
a formidable heterogeneity of wealth. Curdia and Woodford [2009] develop an insurance
scheme that makes it possible to aggregate across agents in a tractable way. Agents can
6The setting is identical to Curdia and Woodford, and the reader is referred to their paper for a more
detailed presentation.
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Figure 1: Evolution of Types
s
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sign state contingent contracts that allow them to transfer to or receive resources from
an insurance agency when and only when they have been selected to draw a new type.
These contracts –which are optimal in the context of the Curdia-Woodford model– have
the property that they eliminate all history dependence for those drawing a new type.
In particular, wealth is redistributed in such a way that all agents who end up drawing
the same type after visiting the insurance agency are identical. Curdia and Woodford
then show that the consumption and employment decisions within each type is the same,
independent of individual history. The distribution of wealth across agents at any point
in time becomes irrelevant.
1.1.2 The Household’s Budget Constraint
The net wealth of household i at the end of period t is
Bt(i) = At(i)− Ptcµt(i)t (i) +
∫ 1
0
Wt(f)h
µt(i)
t (i, f)df + Π
f
t (i) + Π
b
t (i) + Tt(i)− Ptτ
g
t (i) (3)
where Πft (i) and Π
b
t (i) are the profits received by the household as the owner of firms and
banks, Tt(i) is a transfer from the insurance fund (0 unless the household had access to
the agency at the beginning of the period), τ gt (i) is a real lump sum tax, and At(i) denotes
agent i’s nominal assets at the beginning of period t; that is,
At(i) = (1 + i
d
t−1) max(Bt−1(i), 0) + (1 + i
b
t−1) min(Bt−1(i), 0) (4)
ibt−1 is the nominal interest rate on bank loans and i
d
t−1 is the interest rate on bank deposits
created in period t−1. Note that government bonds compete with bank deposits, and the
government bond rate, igt−1, is equal to the deposit rate in equilibrium.
Household i maximizes (1) subject to (3) and (4).
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1.2 Bank Intermediation
Banks issue one period deposits to households that save and make one period loans to
households that borrow. Unlike the operation of the insurance agency, bank intermediation
is costly: a bank expends real resources to make loans. Its costs are given by
Ψt(bt, yt) = ξΨ,tb
η
t exp (−αỹt) with η > 1, α > 0 (5)
where ỹt =
yt−y?
y? denotes the relative deviation of output from its steady state level. ξΨ,t
is a cost shock. Like Curdia and Woodford, we assume that the cost is convex in the
(real) amount of loans made, bt.
7 But, in addition, we assume that banking costs vary
as a function of the business cycle (the output gap). We use this as a proxy for agency
problems (default risk) in credit markets that become more severe during recessions8. This
assumption implies, that loan rates will have a countercyclical spread over deposits rates.
There are compelling theoretical reasons for this countercyclicality9 which also received
strong empirical support.10
Banks are competitive – they take the deposit and lending rates, idt and i
b
t , as given – and
they maximize profits period by period. Real bank profits in period t are
ΠBt
Pt
= dt − bt −Ψt(bt, yt) (6)
The bank chooses dt and bt to maximize profits subject to
11
(1 + idt )dt = (1 + i
b
t)bt (7)
Let us define the spread between the lending and the deposit rate, ωt, by 1 + i
b
t = (1 +
ωt)(1 + i
d
t ), then the bank’s first order condition is
ωt =
∂Ψt(bt, yt)
∂bt
(8)
The cost of making an additional dollar loan (the RHS) is equal to the benefit (the LHS).
Using (5), the bank’s first order condition can be written as
ωt = ηξΨ,tb
η−1
t exp (−αỹt) (9)
7Using the loan to GDP ratio in place of bt does not affect the implications of the model. See the
technical appendix.
8The worsening of agency problems may require greater screening/monitoring efforts on the part of the
intermediaries.
9See Mishkin [2001], for a detailed discussion of how reductions in net worth and cash flows exacerbate
adverse selection and moral hazard problems in lending to firms. Unfortunately, the existing ways of
modelling these agency problems in macroeconomics do not easily apply to models with heterogenous
agents. Curdia and Woodford use the shock to the cost of banking to represent exogenous variation in
the probability of default. We adopt their approach and use the endogenous output gap in place of their
exogenous shock to capture the same variation in default (agency problems).
10See, for instance, Gilchrist and Zakrajsek [2011], Figure 1.
11Following Curdia and Woodford we let banks select deposits and loans subject to this equation. As idt
is smaller than ist , dt > bt. The difference between the volume of deposits and loans is used to pay for the
intermediation costs and is the source also of bank profits.
7
Our assumption that spreads are countercyclical (α > 0) will play a crucial role in what
follows. As noted above, this represents the conventional view in the profession. Nonethe-
less, given the role it plays in our analysis, we also present empirical evidence that supports
it. Table 1 reports estimates of the long–run elasticities of the spread with respect to total
loans, η, and the output gap, α, obtained from the regression
ω̂t = cst+ (θb − 1)̂bt − θyŷt +
∑̀
i=1
γiω̂t−i
where x̂t = (xt − x?)/x?. Output is measured by real GDP and loans correspond to total
loans at commercial banks.12 For both variables we use deviations of the log levels from
a linear trend. The long–run elasticities are obtained as
ηx =
θx
1−
∑`
i=1 γi
Table 1: Spread Regressions (IV estimation)
1960Q1–2008Q4
AAA-FFR BAA-FFR AAA-TBILL BAA-TBILL
η 6.43 7.33 5.87 6.99
(11.84) ( 8.28) ( 8.49) ( 6.86)
α 36.45 28.46 20.25 18.62
( 9.74) ( 7.78) ( 6.40) ( 5.85)
Lags 2 2 4 4
R2b 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
R2y 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
1982Q3–2008Q4
AAA-FFR BAA-FFR AAA-TBILL BAA-TBILL
η 4.32 6.31 4.25 5.60
( 9.72) ( 9.30) ( 7.88) ( 7.58)
α 25.99 26.86 18.35 20.09
(10.38) (11.80) ( 7.26) ( 8.23)
Lags 2 2 2 2
R2b 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
R2y 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
Note: Standard deviations between parenthesis. The number of lags was
determined by a likelihood ratio test. b and y are instrumented by past
values of b, y and ω. R2x, x ∈ {b, y}, reports the R2 of the first stage
regression for both b and y.
The spread is measured as the difference between corporate bond rates, either AAA or
BAA, and either the federal funds rate, FFR, or the Treasury bill rate, TBILL.13 We
12Using instead either consumer loans or business loans produces very similar results, but leads to higher
estimates of the degree of countercyclicality of spreads, α.
13Data sources are reported in Appendix A.
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present two sets of regressions, since monetary policy is generally thought to have changed
fundamentally around 1980. The estimates of the marginal cost parameters, α and η , are
very stable over time. All of the regressions produce a positive and significant estimate of
α. We utilize these regression results to calibrate the parameters in the cost function (5).
1.3 Firms
A continuum of monopolistically competitive firms, indexed by f, produce intermediate
goods using the technology
yt(f) = ξy,tht(f)
1
ϕ (10)
where ht(f) is a CES aggregate of the households’ labor and ξy,t is an auto-regressive
aggregate productivity shock. Competitive retailers buy the intermediate goods at price
Pt(f) and bundle them into the final good, yt, using a CES aggregator with elasticity θ.
The final good is then sold, at price Pt =
(∫ 1
0 Pt(f)
1−θdf
) 1
1−θ
, to households and the
government.
Wages are flexible, but prices are not. In particular we employ the popular Calvo price
setting scheme. In each period, an intermediate good firm gets the opportunity to re-set
price optimally with probability 1− γ. As is well known, a dispersion of intermediate
good prices distorts household consumption patterns and the efficient use of labor. So,
aggregate output is
yt =
ξy,t
∆t
∫ 1
0
ht(f)
1
ϕdf (11)
where ∆t =
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(f)
Pt
)−θ
df > 1 when γ > 0. When γ = 0, prices are flexible and there
is no price dispersion; that is, ∆t = 1.
In equilibrium
yt = πbc
b
t + πsc
s
t + gt + Ψt(bt, yt) (12)
1.4 Government
The consolidated government flow budget constraint is
τ gt + b
g
t =
1 + igt−1
πt
bgt−1 + gt (13)
where igt is the interest rate on government bonds; it will be recalled that i
g
t = i
d
t (since
savers are indifferent between holding bank deposits and public debt). Government spend-
ing follows an auto-regressive process
log(gt) = ρg log(gt−1) + (1− ρg) log(g?) + ξg,t (14)
9
where ξg,t is an innovation. Increases in government spending are initially bond financed,
but lump sum taxes increase over time to stabilize the debt
τt = τ
? + %
bt−1 − b?
y?
(15)
Note that Ricardian equivalence does not hold in our model. In particular, borrowers
discount future liabilities at a rate that exceeds the interest rate on public debt.14 A tax
cut financed by an increase in government debt generates a positive wealth effect for them.
Monetary policy follows a standard interest rate rule
igt = ρii
g
t−1 + (1− ρi)
[
ig
?
+ κπ(πt − π?) + κy
(
yt − y?
y?
)]
+ ξi,t (16)
where πt is the rate of inflation and ξi,t is a policy shock.
1.5 Model Calibration
The baseline calibration of our model’s parameters closely follows Curdia and Wood-
ford [2009, 2010]15 and is reported in Table 2. In what follows, we will let
uµ(cµ, ξ) =
ξµc
1
σµ cµ
1− 1
σµ
1− 1σµ
and vµ(hµ, ξ) = ψµ
ξ−νh h
µ1+ν
1 + ν
(17)
The curvature parameters of the utility functions, σb and σs, are set so that the average
curvature parameter is 6.25 and the ratio of the curvature parameters is σb/σs = 5.
The levels of ξbc and ξ
s
c are set in a way that guarantees that borrowers always have a
higher marginal utility than the savers (see equation 2). The value of the labor elasticity
parameter is as in Curdia and Woodford. The discount factor, β, is set so that the
nominal deposit rate is 1% per quarter. Households’ access to the insurance agency is
infrequent: δ = 0.975. But once there, the household has a 50–50 chance of changing type:
πb = πs =
1
2 .
On the firm side, the inverse labor elasticity is set to ψ = 0.75, and the elasticity of
substitution between intermediate goods is set so that the markup rate is 15%. The Calvo
parameter and the production parameters are standard in the literature. Setting γ = 2/3
means that price settings last 3 quarters on average. The parameters of the interest rate
rule and the process for government spending are also representative of those used in the
literature.
14Savers also discount the future at a rate exceeding that on public debt because of the possibility of
switching type.
15More precisely, the parameters are set using the same methodology as in Curdia and Woodford.
However, since our model departs slightly from theirs in several minor ways (for example, we do not have
sales taxes) some of our parameters differ from theirs.
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Table 2: Parameters
Parameter Value
Household
Discount Factor β 0.9874
Intertemp. Elasticity (Borrowers) σb 12.2209
Intertemp. Elasticity (savers) σs 2.4442
Inverse Frischian Labor Elasticity ν 0.1048
Disutility of Labor param. (Borrowers) ψb 1.1492
Disutility of Labor param. (Savers) ψs 0.9439
Probability of Drawing Borrowers type πb 0.5000
Probability of Keeping Type δ 0.9750
Debt Share b/y 4×0.8
Preference Shock (Average, Borrowers) log(ξ
b
c) 8.0133
Preference Shock (Average, Savers) log(ξ
s
c) 0.8123
Production
Elasticity of Subst. btw. goods θ 7.6667
Inverse labor Elasticity 1/ϕ 0.7500
Financial Costs
Borrowing Elasticity η 6.5000
Output Gap Elasticity α 23.0000
Constant ξΨ 1.2720e-06
Nominal Aspects
Annual Premium (Gross) (1 + ω)4 1.0200
Degree of Nominal Rigidities γ 0.6667
Persistence (Taylor Rule) ρi 0.8000
Reaction to Inflation (Taylor Rule) κπ 1.5000
Reaction to Output (Taylor Rule) κy 0.0500
Shocks
Government Shock (Persistence) ρg 0.9700
Government Share g/y 0.2000
Persistence (Other shocks: x) ρx 0.9500
Debt feedback % 0.0200
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The financial costs parameters are of great importance for our analysis. The values used
for η and α are representative of the estimates reported in Table 1. η is set to 6.5, which
actually coincides with the value used in Curdia and Woodford. α is set to 23, which is
representative of the values obtained in the regressions.16 With this value, spreads are
about 4% during a recession with a GDP gap of −2.5% and about 1% in a boom of the
same magnitude. The average value of the financial shock, ξΨ is set so that, as in Curdia
and Woodford, the steady state annual premium is 2% (which is in line with the values
reported in the literature; see, e.g., Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 2011). This also implies
that steady state financial costs represent 0.24% of output. Note that we later conduct a
thorough sensitivity analysis on these parameters.
The model is solved under perfect foresight using the non–linear method proposed by
Laffargue [1990] and Boucekkine [1995] as implemented in DYNARE.
2 Cyclical Fiscal Multipliers
We can compute multipliers over the business cycle for cycles generated by any of the
shocks in the model. Let ξx denote a shock to the exogenous variable x. Let us denote
by ξRx , respectively ξ
E
x , the value of the shock to the exogenous variable x that triggers
a recession, respectively expansion. In our benchmark experiment, we choose a ξRx that
is large enough to make output fall by 2.5%; then, we choose a ξEx that will make output
rise by 2.5%.17
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of fiscal policy over the business cycle we generate an
expansion or recession and then immediately induce a fiscal response to it by having the
government spending shock, ξg,t, respond by one percent. Let zt+i(ξx, g) denote the path
of either consumption or aggregate output following a shock to the exogenous variable x
which is accompanied by a fiscal response, and let zt+i(ξx) denote the path in the absence
of a fiscal response. Then the cumulative multiplier h quarters after the shock is computed
as
M zh(ξx) =
h∑
i=0
(zt+i(ξx, g)− zt+i(ξx))
h∑
i=0
(gt+i − g?)
(18)
16Note that the value chosen is rather conservative. As noted previously, when consumer loans or
business loans are used in place of total loans, higher values of α are obtained. Using those values would
result in even higher multipliers during recessions (in the range of 3 to 4).
17Note that the two shocks need not be of the same size (in absolute value) since the model is not linear.
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2.1 Financial Market Shocks and Multipliers
In our benchmark simulations, we study business cycles caused by the shock to the spread,
ξΨ. Figure 2 shows impulse response functions (IRF) for output in the absence of a fiscal
response. The dark (or black) IRF is generated by a positive shock that is large enough
to cause a output to fall by 2.5%. The light (or red) IRF is generated by a negative shock
that would cause a 2.5% expansion; the graph for an expansion has been inverted for easier
comparison with the recession case.
Figure 2: IRF of Output to a Financial Market Shock (Benchmark Experiment)
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The IRF’s are not symmetric. In particular, output reverts to its steady state value more
quickly in the case of a recession; a fact which is consistent with the empirical evidence
(see Hamilton [1989], Beaudry and Koop [1993], Acemoglu and Scott [1997]). This is due
to the fact that any given change in output has a more powerful effect on the premium
during recessions, which serves to accelerate the process of recovery during recessions.
The reason for this lies in the existence of a powerful financial accelerator during recessions.
An increase in output of a given size translates into a larger reduction in the financial
friction and thus a greater output gain during recessions than during expansions.This is
due to the fact that at the depth of a recession, the spread, ibt − idt , is large and more
sensitive to improvements in economic activity (if α > 1), and the accelerator speeds up
the recovery; by contrast, at the peak of an expansion, the bank spread is smaller and its
sensitivity to output movements low, and hence the accelerator propelling output back to
its steady state is weaker.
Figure 3 reports the cumulative output multipliers generated when fiscal policy reacts con-
temporaneously to the financial shock. The dark line shows multipliers during a recession;
the light line shows multipliers during an expansion. For the recession, the first quarter
(and maximal) multiplier is about 2.25; for the expansion, it is less than unity (0.89).
13
Figure 3: Output Multipliers (Benchmark Experiment)
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These multipliers are in line with the empirical results of Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
[2010].18
Figure 4: Consumption Multipliers (Benchmark Experiment)
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Figure 4 reports cumulative multipliers for aggregate consumption, and for borrowers
and savers individually; it shows what the determinants of the output multipliers are.
An increase in government spending that is partly financed by higher taxes raises the
18More precisely, they find that the maximum output multiplier (over the first 20 quarters) during a
recession is 2.48, with the 95% confidence interval given by [1.93;3.03]. Note, though, that our IRF cannot
match the shape of theirs. Naturally, as we show in the technical appendix, adding real rigidities such as
habit persistence delays the peak in the multiplier.
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present and future tax burden on all agents. This by itself has a negative wealth effect on
households. In the standard model, this is the only effect, and the Ricardian households are
induced to work harder and/or consume less in order to meet their higher tax obligations.
In our model, however, there is an additional effect that operates through the credit
friction. The reduction of the spread caused by higher government spending has a positive
effect on the consumption of the credit constrained agent. If this effect is large enough
relative to the negative wealth effect associated with the higher expected taxes, then the
borrowers end up increasing their consumption (while the savers’ consumption drops).
Figure 5: Financial Markets (Benchmark Experiment)
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An expansion in government spending during a severe recession (a period of high spreads)
has thus the potential to lead to an increase in the consumption of borrowers that exceeds
the reduction in the consumption of the savers. Aggregate consumption rises. This is
sufficient to produce output multipliers that are greater than one. But in expansions, the
increase in the consumption of the borrowers is smaller, and in our calibration, aggregate
consumption falls; output multipliers are less than one. The reason for this result lies in
the asymmetric cyclical variation of the spread. As can be seen in Figure 5, the spread,
ibt − i
g
t (=i
b
t − idt ), widens disproportionately during a recession while it contracts in an
expansion. That is, any amelioration in the financial friction is much more stimulating for
the borrowers –who play the crucial role for the multiplier– in bad than in good times.
Figure 6 provides some direct suggestive evidence concerning the relationship between
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spreads and government spending (the government spending to GDP share) that supports
our theoretical analysis. We classify periods as either a ”recession” or as an ”expansion”
depending on whether output in that period is above or below the H-P trend. The red
dots in the graph correspond to recessions and the black ones to expansions. We then fit
a regression line for each category of the state of the business cycle using instrumental
variables (past values of the regressors). The figure exhibits three features. First and
consistent with the empirical findings reported in section 1.2, spreads are on average
higher during recessions than during expansions. Second, spreads are negatively related
to government spending. And third and more important from the point of view of the
properties of the model discussed above, there is a cyclical asymmetry. In particular, the
effect of any change in government spending (as a share of GDP) on spreads is considerably
more pronounced during recessions relative to booms (the slope of the red line is steeper
than that of the black line). Related information on correlations between g/y and spreads
is reported in Table 3.
Figure 6: Spreads and Government Expenditure
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Note: Dark plain line: Booms, Red plain line: Recessions. A “recession” is identified with periods during
which the cyclical component of output (obtained from the HP filter) is negative. Period: 1960Q1-2008Q1.
It is worth noting that the resources used in the intermediation process are a small share
of output (0.24% of steady state output) and, moreover, they do not directly matter
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Table 3: Correlation Spread–Share of Government Spending
AAA-FFR BAA-FFR AAA-TBILL BAA-TBILL
Boom -0.2244 -0.2631 -0.2795 -0.3136
Recession -0.4888 -0.5041 -0.6493 -0.6017
significantly for the size of the multiplier. For instance, consider a 2.5% recession. In this
case, intermediation cots are 0.48% of output. And because the reduction in the spread
induced by higher spending leads to higher borrowing, direct intermediation costs increase,
subtracting from output (−0.20) reducing the multiplier somewhat.
Table 4: The role of Intermediation Costs
1% 2.5%
E R E R
Ψt(bt,ỹt)
yt
(%) 0.18 0.32 0.11 0.48
Multiplier (Ψt(bt, ỹt)) -0.04 -0.10 -0.02 -0.20
Multiplier (y) 1.12 1.57 0.89 2.27
Note: E denotes an expansion and R denotes a recession.
2.2 Debt vs Tax Finance of Government Spending and Multipliers
In our benchmark simulations, the lump sum tax rule (15) stabilizes debt dynamics.
This means that the increase in government spending is partially bond financed. Figure 7
shows how Figure 3 would change if the debt-tax rule were replaced by a balanced budget
rule.
Figure 7: Output Multipliers (Balanced Budget)
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The cumulative multipliers in Figure 7 are now smaller than those shown in Figure 3.
The reason is that the increase in the consumption of the borrowers is lower (See Figure
17
8). As in the case with partly debt financed spending, government spending expands
output and closes the output gap, which makes the credit spread decrease and generates a
positive wealth effect for the borrowers. But unlike the case of debt financed spending, the
borrower is taxed in the current period and so has fewer funds to spend on consumption.
This implies a weaker consumption response and a smaller multiplier.
Figure 8: Consumption Multipliers (Balanced Budget)
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In contrast, the savers’ consumption drops by less under a balanced government budget.
This is due to the difference in interest rates across the two schemes of financing gov-
ernment spending. When no debt is issued the deposit rate is lower than when debt is
issued (due to the violation of Ricardian equivalence). With a lower interest rate there
is less of an incentive to reduce current consumption. Nonetheless, the differential effect
on the consumption of the savers is much smaller than that on the borrowers, so total
consumption increases by less, leading to lower multipliers.
While the mechanisms are different, this result is reminiscent of a similar result in the
traditional IS-LM, Keynesian model, namely, that the size of the multiplier varies with
the method used to finance government spending. And that the greater the reliance on
debt, the greater the multipliers.
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2.3 The Size of the Fiscal Shock and Multipliers
Does the size of the multiplier vary with the size of the fiscal expansion? Figure 9 shows
that the multiplier is decreasing in the size of the fiscal intervention. For instance, the
impact multiplier for a 5% or 10% intervention is lower than that for 1% (1.85, 1.65 and
2.25 respectively). The reason that large amounts of government spending may prove less
effective than smaller amounts is that the –negative– marginal wealth effect due to the
higher tax liabilities is increasing in the size of the fiscal intervention while the –positive–
marginal effect on the borrower from the reduction in the premium is decreasing in the
size of the fiscal expansion.19
Figure 9: Output Multipliers: Size of Fiscal Shock
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2.4 Multipliers and the Source of the Business Cycle
Expansions and recessions can have a variety of origins and the size of multipliers may
well depend upon the source of the business cycle.20 Table 5 reports cumulative output
multipliers for various types of shocks: the first three are preference shocks (to the marginal
utility of the impatient and patient households and the disutility of labor), the fourth is
the financial shock used in the benchmark scenario above, the fifth is a productivity shock
(ξy,t), and the sixth is a monetary policy shock (ξi,t). In all cases the size of the shock is
such that it generates a recession (resp. expansion) of 2.5%.
There is some variation in the impact multipliers; our benchmark shock gives the largest
impact multiplier. Importantly, no matter the source of the business cycle, multipliers are
larger in recessions (about 2) and smaller (around one or less) in expansions. After the
first year, the cause of the business cycle does not seem to matter any more.
19Note that our model is silent on normative issues such as the optimal size of the fiscal intervention.
20Hereafter and unless clearly specified, we will refer to output multipliers as multipliers
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Table 5: Multipliers: Sensitivity to the Source of the Business Cycle
Shock 1 Quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years
E R E R E R E R
ξbc,t 1.02 1.86 0.73 0.87 0.61 0.67 0.51 0.54
ξsc,t 0.95 2.00 0.70 0.90 0.59 0.68 0.51 0.55
ξh,t 0.94 1.94 0.69 0.90 0.59 0.68 0.51 0.55
ξΨ,t 0.89 2.17 0.70 0.91 0.59 0.69 0.51 0.55
ξy,t 0.94 1.94 0.69 0.90 0.59 0.68 0.51 0.55
ξi,t 1.06 1.85 0.76 0.86 0.62 0.67 0.51 0.54
Note: This table reports the cumulative multipliers of output obtained in a
2.5% expansion (E) and in a 2.5% recession (R) generated by each of the shocks
considered.
3 Sensitivity to Parameters
In this section we examine whether the size of the multipliers implied by our model
is sensitive to the calibration used. We consider variation in: i) the degree of price
rigidity, ii) the amplitude of the business cycle, iii), the parameters of the monetary
policy rule and, iv) the parameters in the bank lending cost function.21. In no case do
minor perturbations make a big difference for the size of the multipliers. The sensitivity
analysis will be conducted only under the benchmark bank lending cost shock as the last
section showed that the source of the cycle did not make much of a difference.
3.1 The Degree of Price Rigidity
Figure 10 shows that cumulative output multipliers rise as the degree of price rigidity, γ
(the Calvo parameter), increases and that they reach their maximum at about γ = 0.8.
Our benchmark setting is γ = 0.67, that is, prices are reset on average every 3 quarters.
In the New Keynesian literature, common values for γ are 0.67 and 0.75. In this range the
multiplier are large in recessions and small in expansions, and of a magnitude consistent
with the findings of Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2010]. The reason that the multiplier
is increasing in the degree of price rigidity is that, the more rigid the prices, the bigger
the effect of government spending on closing the output gap and hence the larger the
decline in the spread. Under our calibration, this effect peaks at about γ = 0.8 and then it
declines somewhat (but remains large). The reason for this non-monotonicity seems to be
that under extreme degrees of price rigidity, monetary policy is more potent and it closes
more of the output gap by itself, leaving less room for the fiscal stimulus to manifest its
21An appendix that is available upon request reports additional robustness checks are empirical evidence
as well as a discussion of whether and how the model can generate hump shaped multipliers.
20
Figure 10: Multipliers: Degree of Nominal Rigidity
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potency.
3.2 Amplitude of the Business Cycle
The model being non-linear, the size of the multiplier ought to depend on the amplitude
of the business cycle. Figure 11 shows that this is indeed the case: the size of multipliers
in a recession grows with the amplitude of the cycle, while the size of multipliers in an
expansion falls with an increase in the amplitude. In our benchmark case, we chose
shocks that made output rise or fall by 2.5%, which may be deemed a normal amplitude
for business cycles. The impact multiplier during a recession was 2.17. But for a deeper
Figure 11: Multipliers: Amplitude of the Cycle
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recession of say 3.5%, the impact multiplier would be about 3. The multipliers rise quickly
with the magnitude of the recession.
The reason for this can be found in, yet again, the cyclical variation of the spreads.
The deeper the recession the larger the interest rate spread, ibt − i
g
t , and also and more
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importantly the larger the elasticity of the spread to a variation in ỹ.22 Hence after an
increase in fiscal expenditures, the amelioration of the financial friction will be larger
in deeper recessions. The potential output gains from a fiscal stimulus are therefore
magnified. On the contrary, the greater the expansion, the smaller the elasticity and
hence the smaller the gains from the mitigation of the friction.
3.3 Multipliers and the Conduct of Monetary Policy
As the literature on the zero bound has shown, multipliers are not independent of the
conduct of monetary policy. Figure 12 shows how monetary policy, through its concern
for inflation and output fluctuations, can affect cumulative multipliers.
Figure 12: Multipliers and Monetary Policy (κy, κπ)
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(b) Reaction to Inflation (κπ)
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Panel (a) suggests that an increase in the reaction of monetary authorities to the output
gap lowers the size of the multiplier. This is because a stronger reaction means that
monetary policy closes more of the output gap and hence lowers the spread by more. As
we have shown before, fiscal policy is less effective when applied to a smaller spread, so
the multipliers are decreasing in the level of κy.
22This elasticity is given by −αỹt.
22
Panel (b) depicts the multiplier as a function of the reaction to inflation, κπ. In order
to facilitate the exposition we employed a policy rule with κy = 0.
23 An increase in the
weight placed on price stability means a smaller multiplier. The reason is as follows.
Consider a negative financial shock. Both output and inflation decrease. The central
bank cuts interest rates as inflation is below target, and the cut is larger the larger κπ.
A more expansionary monetary policy means a smaller –negative– output gap and thus
a smaller spread. But with a smaller spread, the effects of fiscal policy on output are
smaller. That is, a more aggressive countercyclical monetary policy limits the contribution
of countercyclical fiscal policy.
3.4 The Role of Banking Parameters
As argued before, the existence of a sizable multiplier lies in the presence of the “financial
accelerator mechanism” described at the end of section 3.2. One measure of the degree
of financial friction is ω = ib − id, the steady state level of the spread between borrowing
and deposit rates. Figure 13 shows that the cumulative output multipliers in a recession
vary significantly with perturbations to the steady state spread. For instance, while in our
benchmark calibration —an annual spread of 2%— the recession multiplier is about 2.2,
raising the spread by just 20 basis points increases the recession multiplier by about 50%
(around 3.25).
Figure 13: Multipliers: Size of Premium (ω?)
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The reason is that a larger steady state spread corresponds to a larger gap between the
rates used to discount future consumption streams and tax liabilities. Hence the potential
positive wealth effects for borrowers –and hence the multipliers– are larger the greater is
the spread.
23As expected in light of the previous discussion, this leads to much larger multipliers.
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The elasticity of bank lending costs to the output gap, α, is a parameter that is funda-
mental to our quantitative results. A larger α means that the spread is more sensitive to
the state of the business cycle, and thus that fiscal policy is more effective: An increase in
aggregate demand during a recession has a large impact on the spread, generating large
positive wealth effects on borrowers and driving the size of the multiplier up. Figure 14
shows that even small perturbations in α can have a big effect on the cumulative out-
put multipliers. We chose α = 23 in our benchmark setting as suggested by our empirical
estimates (reported in Table 1). This value produced multipliers consistent with the multi-
pliers found by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2010] in the data. However, our regressions
can not rule out even larger values of α that would give rise to even larger multipliers.
For instance, a value of α of 29 gives a multiplier in a recession of about 4.
Figure 14: Multipliers: Degree of asymmetry (α)
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One can similarly analyze the role of η for the multiplier. In general, a higher η means
a larger spread for any given level of debt. Hence its implications for the multiplier are
quite similar to those discussed above for the steady state spread.
4 Conclusion
Countercyclical fiscal policy represents a puzzle. Policymakers routinely fight economic
downturns by using budget deficits, presumably because they think that fiscal multipliers
are large. While this is in line with Keynes’s original recommendation and is consistent
with traditional IS-LM type of thinking, there exists preciously little in terms of modern
economic thinking that supports multiplier values exceeding unity during recessions.
Some recent work has suggested that the zero nominal interest bound may make multipliers
large during recessions (exceeding one) even when they are quite small during expansion.
But, except for the recent recession, countercyclical policy does not seem to coincide with
24
the presence of such constraint on monetary policy, so the zero bound cannot be the full
story.
In this paper we have proposed an alternative, more general theory of large and cyclically
variable multipliers. Our theory is based on the postulate that financial frictions matter
for the business cycle. And how much they matter varies over the business cycle. There
exists a presumption in the literature that the variation in the financial frictions is coun-
tercyclical, and we have provided empirical evidence supporting this presumption. We
show that countercylical financial frictions can make government spending quite effective
during recessions, in particular when financed by debt. The main mechanism is similar to
the old-Keynesian idea that providing financially strapped agents (households and firms)
with funds creates a positive wealth effect for them even when they take into account
any increase in their future tax liabilities. The more severe and widespread the financial
constraints, the larger this wealth effect and thus the higher the likelihood of a positive
aggregate consumption response to a fiscal stimulus. While our analysis relies on spread
movements rather than on the relaxation of quantitative borrowing constraints the logic
is the same.
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A Data Sources
• Total Loans and Leases at Commercial Banks (LOANS): http://research.stlouisfed.
org/fred2/series/LOANS?cid=49
• Real Gross Domestic Product (GDPC1): http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/
series/GDPC1?cid=106
• Effective Federal Funds Rate (FEDFUNDS) http://research.stlouisfed.org/
fred2/series/FEDFUNDS?cid=118
• 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate (TB3MS): http://research.stlouisfed.
org/fred2/series/TB3MS?cid=116
• Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield (AAA): http://research.stlouisfed.
org/fred2/series/AAA?cid=47
• Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield (BAA): http://research.stlouisfed.
org/fred2/series/BAA?cid=47
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